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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Beginning with the Equal Protection Clause of the United States 
Constitution1 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 the United States has 
made great strides in its journey towards widespread racial equality in 
both the private and public sectors. Such success, however, has not 
come without a cost. In an effort to maximize equality in the 
workforce, employers have engaged in controversial hiring decisions, 
to the dismay of countless applicants who believe that they have been 
disadvantaged due to their non-minority classification.3 
The City of New Haven, Connecticut, administered examinations 
for the purpose of filling vacancies in the command ranks of its fire 
department.4 Due to the racially unequal distribution of the test 
results,5 the New Haven Civil Service Board (“the Board”) refused to 
certify the results of the two promotional examinations in an alleged 
effort to comply with state and federal anti-discrimination laws.5 
Frank Ricci, a white man, along with sixteen other white individuals 
 
 *  2010 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]o state shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws . . . .”). 
 2. 42 U.S.C. § 1971 et seq. (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1976) (Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act prohibits discrimination by employers on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin). 
 3. See Biondo v. City of Chicago, 382 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2004) (allegedly favoring 
minorities in employment decisions); see Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci I), 554 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D. 
Conn. 2006) (same). 
 4. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 145. 
5 Id. 
 5. Id. at 150. 
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and one Hispanic (Petitioners) who fared well on the examinations 
but received no promotion, brought suit alleging that the city officials 
charged with making the hiring decisions for the fire department 
violated their civil (Title VII) and constitutional (Equal Protection 
Clause) rights to be free from employment discrimination and to 
enjoy the equal protection of the laws.6 
On September 28, 2006, the District Court of Connecticut granted 
Respondents’ motion for summary judgment on both the Title VII 
and equal protection claims.7 The Second Circuit, by summary order 
entered February 15, 2008, adopted and fully affirmed the district 
court’s judgment. It later converted this summary order into a binding 
precedential opinion before voting seven to six to deny rehearing en 
banc.8 Due to a circuit split on the issue, the United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari9 on January 9, 2009, to determine whether, 
under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause, a state employer 
may reject the results of a race-neutral civil-service selection 
examination due to unintended racially-disproportionate test results.10 
II.  FACTS 
In November and December 2003, the New Haven Fire 
Department sought to fill Captain and Lieutenant vacancies by 
administering written and oral examinations to its firefighters.11 
Petitioners are seventeen white candidates and one Hispanic 
candidate12 who expended significant sums of money, studied 
intensely, and performed very well on the promotional exams but who 
were denied promotion because, without the Board’s certification of 
the test results, the promotional process could not move forward.13 
Pursuant to New Haven’s Charter and Civil Service Regulations, 
hiring and promotions must be based strictly on merit as determined 
 
 6. Supplemental Brief of Petitioners at 1, Ricci v. DeStefano, No. 07-1428 (U.S. Aug. 21, 
2008). 
 7. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 163. 
 8. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12–13, Ricci v. DeStefano, No. 08-328 (U.S. Sept. 8, 
2008). 
 9. Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci II), 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam), cert. granted, 129 
S. Ct. 894 (mem.) (U.S. Jan. 9, 2009) (No. 08-328). 
 10. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Ricci v. DeStefano, No. 08-328 (U.S. Sept. 8, 2008). 
 11. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 145. 
 12. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Ricci v. DeStefano, No. 08-328 (U.S. Sept. 8, 2008). 
 13. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp at 144, 146. 
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by competitive examination.14 After each examination, the Civil 
Service Board must certify a list of those eligible for promotion and 
fill each employment vacancy according to the “Rule of Three,” which 
mandates that a civil service position be filled from among the top 
three scorers on the list.15 I/O Solutions (“IOS”), a seven-year-old 
Illinois company that specializes in entry-level and promotional 
examinations for public safety departments, designed the 
examinations that the New Haven Fire Department utilized in 2003.16 
Forty-one applicants took the exam to fill the Captain vacancies, 
of which twenty-five were white, eight were black, and eight were 
Hispanic.17 Based on the scores and pursuant to the “Rule of Three,” 
no blacks and at most two Hispanics would be eligible for promotion 
because the top nine scorers were seven whites and two Hispanics.18 
Seventy-seven applicants took the exam to fill the Lieutenant 
vacancies, of which forty-three were white, nineteen were black, and 
fifteen were Hispanic. Because all of the top scorers were white, no 
blacks or Hispanics would have been eligible for promotion.19 
Due to the correlation between test performance and race, which 
reflected a disparate impact,the Civil Service Board held five hearings 
to determine whether it should certify the results and promote the top 
scorers in accordance with past practice or instead reject the results 
due to their racial disproportion.20 During these hearings, the Board 
heard from a variety of experts and state officials regarding the 
fairness of the test and possible reasons for the disparate impact.21 
Ultimately, the board split two to two on the question of certifying 
each exam, which resulted in the promotional lists not being 
certified.22 
Ricci v. DeStefano arises from the decision not to certify the exams 
and the allegedly discriminatory consequences of the Board’s 
 
 14. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4–5, Ricci v. DeStefano, No. 08-328 (U.S. Sept. 8, 
2008). 
 15. Id. at 5. 
 16. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 145. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. The City Charter mandates a “Rule of Three,” which requires all civil service 
positions to be filled by an individual among the top three scores on such an exam. The top nine 
scores included seven white applicants and two Hispanic applicants. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 145–46. 
 21. Id. at 145–50. 
 22. Id. at 150. 
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decision.23 Petitioners allege that non-certification was due to political 
pressure—an effort to garner the votes of minority constituents in 
New Haven—and amounted to both Title VII and Equal Protection 
violations; Respondents argue that the decision not to certify was 
made wholly for the purposes of complying with federal, state, and 
local anti-discrimination laws.24 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the Supreme Court 
delineated a three-part burden-shifting test to apply to Title VII cases 
involving an allegation of intentional discrimination in an 
employment termination.25 Under this framework, plaintiffs first must 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination on account of race.26 To 
do so, they must prove: (1) membership in a protected class; (2) 
qualification for the position; (3) an adverse employment action; and 
(4) circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination on the 
basis of membership in the protected class.27 The burden of 
production then shifts to the employer who must articulate some 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the rejection of the 
employee.28 The employer’s burden is satisfied if the proffered 
evidence, “‘taken as true, would permit the conclusion that there was 
a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action.’”29 If the employer 
puts forth such a neutral reason for the employee’s termination, the 
burden shifts back to the employee to prove that the employer’s 
alleged reason was in fact a pretext for discrimination.30 
 
 23. Id. at 144. 
 24. Id. at 150–51. 
 25. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Although McDonnell 
Douglas involved an employment termination, its test still applies to non-promotion 
employment cases as well. 
 26. Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 27. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. (“The complainant in a Title VII trial must 
carry the initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial 
discrimination. This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he 
applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, 
despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position 
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s 
qualifications.”). 
 28. Id.; Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000). 
 29. Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 88 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. 
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993)). 
 30. Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci I), 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 152 (D. Conn. 2006). 
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In Hayden v. County of Nassau, white and Hispanic applicants to 
the police department, including both males and females, brought a 
class action lawsuit against the county alleging that the police officers’ 
entrance examination, which was designed to minimize discriminatory 
impact on minority candidates, actually discriminated against non-
minority candidates in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, Title 
VII, and the Civil Rights Act.31 The Second Circuit held that the race-
conscious configuration of the exam did not violate any of these 
provisions because the Nassau County Police Department was merely 
complying with several consent decrees prohibiting it from engaging 
in discriminatory practices or utilizing examinations that were unfair 
to minority applicants.32 The county had conducted a validity analysis 
to determine the configuration of the exam that both was sufficiently 
job-related and minimized the adverse impact on minority 
applicants.33 Plaintiffs asserted that the choice to reconfigure the 
exam, in order to reduce the adverse impact on black candidates, 
necessarily discriminated against non-minorities on the basis of race.34 
The Hayden court rejected plaintiffs’ contentions and stated that 
plaintiffs were “mistaken in treating racial motive as a synonym for 
constitutional violation” and that “[e]very antidiscrimination statute 
aimed at racial discrimination, and every enforcement measure taken 
under such a statute, reflect a concern with race.”35 This concern alone, 
however, does not render these statutes automatically unlawful.36 The 
court held that the construction of the Nassau County test to 
minimize adverse impact on minorities was not intentional reverse 
discrimination against whites because all applicants took the same 
test and were thus treated uniformly on the basis of race.37 In response 
to plaintiffs’ assertion that the design of the test illustrated 
impermissible discriminatory intent, the Second Circuit stated that 
nothing in the court’s jurisprudence disallowed the use of race-neutral 
means to improve racial equality;38 rather, the court held that “the 
 
 31. Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 46 (2d Cir. 1999). The Second Circuit 
analyzes hiring and promotion decisions in a like manner. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 46–47. A validation study is the process that establishes, by statistical analysis, 
that a particular test serves its intended purpose and measures the appropriate criteria. 
 34. Id. at 47. 
 35. Id. at 49 (quoting Raso v. Lago, 135 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 1998)). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 50. 
 38. Id. at 51. 
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intent to remedy the disparate impact of the prior exams is not 
equivalent to an intent to discriminate against non-minority 
applicants.”39 
In Kirkland v. New York State Department of Correctional 
Services, the Second Circuit dealt with the issue of voluntary 
compliance with regard to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.40 It stated 
that voluntary compliance is, in fact, a “preferred means of achieving 
Title VII’s goal of eliminating employment discrimination.”41 The 
Second Circuit, in Kirkland, affirmed the district court’s decision to 
approve a settlement that dealt with promotional order among the 
ranks of the employees at the Department of Correctional Services 
after minority employees had put forth a prima facie case of adverse 
impact.42 This settlement would attempt to correct the discrimination 
present in the examinations by determining promotion order on the 
basis of both exam results and race-normed adjustments to the 
exam.43 The court noted that requiring a full hearing before approving 
the settlement would undermine Title VII’s preference for voluntary 
compliance and was thus unwarranted.44 Accordingly, it determined 
that voluntary compliance with Title VII actions are presumptively 
valid and should be approved unless there is some showing of 
provisions that are either unlawful or against public policy.45 Therefore 
the court held that a statistical demonstration of disproportionate 
racial impact regarding an employment decision constitutes “a 
sufficiently serious claim of discrimination to serve as a predicate for 
a voluntary compromise containing race-conscious remedies.”46 
The Second Circuit expanded Kirkland in Bushey v. New York 
State Civil Service Commission.47 In Bushey, the Civil Service 
administered a series of promotional examinations for supervisory 
positions in the state’s correctional services departent; as in Kirkland, 
the tests indicated a significant adverse impact on minorities, with 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. Kirkland v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 711 F.2d 1117, 1121 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 41. Id. at 1128. 
 42. Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci I), 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 157 (D. Conn. 2006); Kirkland, 711 
F.2d at 1130. 
 43. Kirkland, 711 F.2d at 1133. 
 44. Id. at 1130. 
 45. Id. at 1128–29. 
 46. Id. at 1130. 
 47. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 157; Bushey v. N.Y. State Civil Serv. Comm’n (Bushey I), 733 
F.2d 220, 227 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1117 (1985) (allowing State to adopt a 
remedial measure without direct pressure from minority applicants). 
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non-minority applicants passing at almost twice the rate of minority 
applicants.48 In order to rectify this situation, the Civil Service race-
normed the scores for each group, which increased the pass rate of the 
minority group to that of the non-minority group.49 Although the 
plaintiffs argued that the state’s adjustment of minority candidates’ 
raw test scores discriminated against non-minority candidates in 
violation of Title VII, the Second Circuit held that the disparate score 
distribution between the two groups was sufficient to establish a 
prima facie showing of an adverse impact on minority test-takers.50 
Therefore, in accordance with Kirkland, there existed a sufficiently 
serious claim of discrimination “to serve as a predicate for employer-
initiated, voluntary race-conscious remedies.”51 
Although the Ricci v. DeStefano court relied primarily on Second 
Circuit decisions, other circuits have handled both Title VII and equal 
protection claims differently by prohibiting most race-based 
government decision-making that is not narrowly tailored to a 
government purpose.52 In Williams v. Consolidated City of 
Jacksonville, for example, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Equal 
Protection Clause does not allow city officials to refuse to fill existing 
employment vacancies based on the race of those in line for them—a 
decision that squarely conflicts with Second Circuit decisions, which 
allow for employers to adopt voluntary remedial measures to avoid 
Title VII liability.53 In Dallas Firefighters Association v. City of Dallas, 
the Fifth Circuit held that the promotion of women and minorities 
over higher-ranked white males violated the Equal Protection Clause 
due to the race-based and gender-based treatment afforded to each 
group.54 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in Biondo v. City of Chicago 
held that neither Title VII nor the Equal Protection Clause allow a 
city to respond to competitive examinations’ disparate impact on 
minorities by denying or delaying promotions of white applicants or 
 
 48. Bushey I, 733 F.2d at 222. 
 49. Id. at 222–23. 
 50. Id. at 224–25. 
 51. Id. at 228. 
 52. See Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 157–60; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 28–29, Ricci v. 
DeStefano, No. 08-328 (U.S. Sept. 8, 2008). 
 53. Williams v. Consol. City of Jacksonville, 341 F.3d 1261, 1269 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 54. Dallas Fire Fighters Assoc. v. City of Dallas, 150 F.3d 438, 441 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. 
denied, 526 U.S. 1038 (1999). 
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by employing race-dependent eligibility lists.55 In essence, while the 
Second Circuit focuses primarily on Title VII implications when 
assessing civil service testing and hiring decisions, other circuits place 
a stronger emphasis on race-based decision-making in conjunction 
with the Fourteenth Amendment and its Equal Protection Clause.56 
IV.  HOLDING 
Because the Second Circuit summarily affirmed “for the reasons 
stated in the thorough, thoughtful, and well-reasoned opinion of the 
court below” and did so without engaging in its own discussion of the 
relevant issues,57 this section focuses primarily on the district court’s 
analysis of the issues presented in this case.58 
A. Title VII Claim 
Because Petitioners alleged that Respondents’ decision not to 
certify the examination results amounted to intentional 
discrimination against the non-minority applicants, the court applied 
the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green three-pronged burden-shifting 
framework to the facts of the case.59 Under this framework, the court 
found that Petitioners satisfied all four factors needed to establish a 
prima facie case of discrimination60: they had shown membership in a 
protected class, qualification for the positions in question, an adverse 
employment action, and circumstances that gave rise to an inference 
of discrimination on the basis of membership in the protected class.61 
Although Respondents argued that Petitioners cannot establish an 
inference of discrimination when all applicants are treated the same, 
the court assumed arguendo that Respondents’ acknowledgement 
that racial concerns motivated their denial of certification was 
sufficient to satisfy the inference of discrimination necessary to 
establish a prima facie case.62 
 
 55. Biondo v. City of Chicago, 382 F.3d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1152 
(2005). An eligibility list is a list of applicants qualified for promotion based on examination 
scores. 
 56. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 28, Ricci v. DeStefano, No. 08-328 (U.S. Sept. 8, 2008). 
 57. Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci II), 530 F.3d 87, 87 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam), cert. granted, 
129 S. Ct. 894 (mem.) (U.S. Jan. 9, 2009) (No. 08-328). 
 58. Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci I), 554 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D. Conn. 2006). 
 59. Id. at 151. 
 60. Id. at 152. 
 61. Id. at 151–52. 
 62. Id. at 152. 
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Once the prima facie case had been established, the burden 
shifted to the Respondents to produce evidence that there was a 
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action taken against the 
Petitioners.63 The court held that Respondents’ good faith attempt to 
comply with Title VII was a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for 
refusing to certify the exams and thus satisfied their burden of 
production under the McDonnell Douglas test.64 To overcome this 
presumption in favor of the Respondents, the Petitioners had to show 
that the City of New Haven’s proffered explanation was pretextual 
and thus merely an attempt to mask the underlying intent to 
discriminate.65 
The court ultimately held that Petitioners failed to show pretext 
on the part of Respondents and thus did not satisfy their third burden 
under the McDonnell Douglas test.66 Although Petitioners argued that 
Respondents’ diversity rationale is prohibited as reverse 
discrimination under Title VII, the court followed both Hayden v. 
County of Nassau and Kirkland v. New York State Department of 
Correctional Services in finding that this statute actually allows for the 
use of race-neutral means to increase minority and female 
representation in the workforce.67 An intent to remedy a disparate 
impact is not, therefore, equivalent to an intent to discriminate against 
non-minority applicants.68 
The court further held that the Respondents’ remedy was 
decidedly less race-conscious than the remedies in Kirkland and 
Bushey v. New York State Civil Services Commission—both of which 
the Second Circuit had approved.69 New Haven did not race-norm the 
scores but rather decided to start over with a new test entirely so as to 
remedy the disparate impact of the last examinations.70 Thus, while the 
Board took race into account when making its decision not to certify 
the results, the outcome was race-neutral due to the fact that all test 
results were discarded and all applicants would have to participate in 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id.; see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing, 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) (finding 
employer’s proferred evidence unworthy of credence). 
 66. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 160. 
 67. Id. at 157–58. 
 68. Id. at 157; Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 69. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 158. 
 70. Id. 
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another selection process.71 Consequently, the court held that 
Petitioners do not have a viable claim of reverse disparate impact or 
discrimination. Utilizing the reasoning of Hayden, the court found no 
evidence of discriminatory animus towards Petitioners; rather, it 
found that the Board, the City of New Haven, and the other 
Respondents were merely trying to eliminate employment 
discrimination by voluntarily complying with Title VII regulations.72 
The court held that Respondents’ motivation to deny promotions due 
to a test with a racially disparate impact does not constitute 
discriminatory intent; as such, there is insufficient evidence for 
Petitioners to prevail on their Title VII claim.73 
B. Equal Protection Claim 
Petitioners argued that Respondents violated the Equal 
Protection Clause either by employing a race-based classification 
system for promotion or by applying facially neutral promotion 
criteria in a racially discriminatory manner.74 In accordance with 
Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, the court acknowledged that non-
minorities have been found to be a protected group for purposes of 
equal protection claims.75 But in response to Petitioners’ claims, the 
court held that Respondents did not employ any racial classifications 
because every applicant was treated in the same way when the Board 
denied certification of the test results.76 In accordance with the 
Hayden decision, the court stated that there is no racial classification 
when an examination is “administered and scored in an identical 
fashion for all applicants” or when an entrance exam is designed to 
diminish an adverse impact on minority applicants.77 Likewise, the 
court rejected the Petitioners’ claim that the exam was a facially 
neutral test used in a discriminatory manner for the same reason the 
Hayden court denied a finding of racial classification—“equal” 
treatment of all applicants.78 The Court rested this premise on the fact 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id.; see also Hayden, 180 F.3d at 51. 
 73. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 160. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 210 (1995); Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 
160. 
 76. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 161; Hayden, 180 F.3d at 48. 
 77. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 161 (quoting Hayden, 180 F.3d at 48). 
 78. Id.; see also supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text. 
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that all applicants took the same test and were scored in an identical 
fashion. 
Although Petitioners continued to assert discriminatory intent on 
the part of Respondents, the court held that Respondents acted to 
further their goal of diversity in the fire department, to remedy the 
exam’s disparate impact on minorities, and to prevent the City from 
being sued under Title VII by unsuccessful minority applicants.79 As a 
result, the court denied the Petitioners’ equal protection claim.80 
V.  ANALYSIS 
The Ricci v. DeStefano holding is problematic from both a legal 
and political standpoint. As stated in Wygant v. Jackson Board of 
Education, “[r]acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently 
suspect and . . . call for the most exacting judicial examination.”81 In 
Ricci, the court acknowledged that Respondents denied promotion to 
non-minority applicants because they were concerned about the racial 
disparities in the test results and that, but for this disparate impact, 
Petitioners would have been promoted.82 Despite this seemingly clear-
cut case of race-based decision-making, the court failed to apply strict 
scrutiny, setting itself apart from other circuit courts.83 Instead, it 
stated that because nobody was promoted and that the result was the 
same for all, no racial classification occurred and a lower level of 
scrutiny was appropriate.84 
The results, however, were not the same for all; those who earn 
low scores should have no right to be promoted, whereas those who 
earn high scores should be eligible to be promoted. Treating 
Petitioners, who were among the top scorers on the exam, and other 
applicants equally—by denying them all a promotion—is an unfair 
manipulation of equal protection law.  
Another error in the court’s judgment is the incongruity in its 
reasoning: for Title VII purposes, the court assumed Petitioners had 
 
 79. Id. at 162. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986) (plurality opinion) (quoting 
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978)). 
 82. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 152. 
 83. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16, Ricci v. DeStefano, No. 08-328 (U.S. Sept. 8, 2008); 
Biondo v. City of Chicago, 382 F.3d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1152 (2005) 
(awarding damages to white applicants for unfair treatment). 
 84. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 161. 
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suffered a race-based adverse employment action, yet it also held that 
no racial classification had occurred for equal protection purposes.85 If 
the court found a racial classification, Respondents would need to 
assert a compelling state interest for their actions and prove that they 
were narrowly-tailored to meet this goal.86 Instead, the court, failing to 
apply strict scrutiny, allowed Respondents to satisfy their burden of 
proof by simply asserting a “good faith belief” that a disparate impact 
existed among the test scores and that this alone justified the decision 
not to certify the exams.87 Such lax equal protection jurisprudence is a 
risky precedent for the court to set. 
While the Second Circuit concluded that Respondents’ allegedly 
race-based decisions were justified due to their desire to fulfill their 
obligations under Title VII, the Seventh Circuit has expressly rejected 
this reasoning in Biondo v. City of Chicago: 
Still, the premise of the City’s argument is that regulations supply a 
compelling governmental interest in making decisions based on 
race. How can that be? Then Congress or any federal agency could 
direct employers to adopt racial quotas, and the direction would be 
self-justifying: the need to comply with the law (or regulation) 
would be the compelling interest. Such a circular process would 
drain the equal protection clause of meaning.88 
In accordance with established rules of statutory construction, a 
statute must be read with the presumption that Congress did not 
intend to authorize conduct strictly prohibited by the Constitution.89 
To allow such behavior would upset the balance of power integral to 
the functioning of the United States government and render the 
Equal Protection Clause powerless in its wake. 
The Ricci courts’ assertion that requiring a judicial determination 
of discrimination against minorities in disparate impact cases would 
undermine Title VII’s policy favoring voluntary compliance is 
relatively unpersuasive.90 The Supreme Court has held in previous 
cases that affirmative action plans must be strictly monitored “to 
 
 85. Id. at 152, 161. 
 86. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2770 (2006) 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
 87. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 152. 
 88. Biondo v. City of Chicago, 382 F.3d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1152 
(2005). 
 89. Bushey v. N.Y. State Civil Serv. Comm’n (Bushey II), 469 U.S. 1117 (1985) (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting). 
 90. See Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 157. 
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prevent the practice of discrimination for discrimination’s sake.”91 In 
an effort to avoid Title VII lawsuits from minority applicants, New 
Haven and related Respondents denied all promotions without 
conducting a validity study of the exams or searching for alternative 
tests with less adverse impact, as other circuits have required, and yet 
were somehow still successful in both the district court and the circuit 
court.92 
A valid, though unsuccessful, argument put forth by Petitioners 
was that Respondents masked their attempt to achieve political 
favoritism among minority voters as an effort to comply with Title VII 
and related anti-discrimination laws.93 Although the court may have 
been hesitant to accept the legitimacy of this contention, Petitioners 
proffered evidence illustrating a pattern of political manipulation by 
the City of New Haven in its promotional decisions in both the police 
and fire departments.94 Such a political motive would seemingly be 
sufficient to establish pretext behind Respondents’ actions, but the 
court held, as had the Tenth Circuit in EEOC v. Flasher Co., Inc., that 
pretext is not shown even if an unseemly reason, such as political 
favoritism, actually accounts for the decision.95 This standard seems to 
have far-reaching political implications. If the Supreme Court fails to 
uphold strict scrutiny in Ricci, the very sort of “race politics” that 
allegedly occurred in New Haven might “lurk behind any racial 
classification not held to the exacting strictures of the [Equal 
Protection] Clause.”96 Elected officials would thus be able to achieve 
political goals and gain the support of minority voters while actually 
engaging in intentional discrimination against non-minority 
constituents. 
Although achieving racial diversity in the New Haven Fire 
Department is an admirable goal, an attempt to do so at the expense 
of well-qualified firemen who worked hard to pass a race-neutral and 
presumptively valid civil service examination deserves stricter judicial 
scrutiny. The Second Circuit adhered to its own jurisprudence in 
 
 91. Bushey II, 469 U.S. at 806–07 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 92. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 150. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 160; see EEOC v. Flasher Co., Inc., 986 F.2d 1312, 1321 (10th Cir. 1992) (pretext 
is not shown merely because “some less seemly reason—personal or political favoritism, a 
grudge, random conduct an error in the administration of neutral rules—actually accounts for 
the decision”). 
 96. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16, Ricci v. DeStefano, No. 08-328 (U.S. Sept. 8, 2008). 
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formulating its opinion, but one has to wonder how long the court’s 
loose scrutiny of seemingly race-based decision-making will fan the 
flames of reverse racial discrimination or if the Supreme Court will 
use Ricci in order to halt this approach. 
VI.  ARGUMENTS AND DISPOSITION 
A. Strengths and Weaknesses of Petitioners’ Argument 
Although Petitioners made several allegations regarding the 
unlawfulness of the City’s actions, they would have been more likely 
to prevail if they had put forth a mixed-motive, rather than an 
intentional, discrimination claim. With intentional discrimination 
comes a heightened burden of proof, whereas a mixed-motive claim is 
subject to the less stringent framework of Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins.97 If Petitioners alleged that Respondents made decisions 
based on a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate considerations, Price 
Waterhouse establishes that Respondents would pass constitutional 
muster only if they could prove that they would have made the same 
decision regardless of the discriminating/illegitimate factor.98 Here, 
Respondents’ decision to decline certification of the exam results was 
motivated, at least in part, by the race of those who scored well on the 
exam; thus, it would be difficult for Respondents to escape liability 
under this framework.99 Though Petitioners asserted political 
influence and fear of public criticism as reasons behind Respondents’ 
actions, doing so under the mixed-motive framework would have 
resulted in a better chance of prevailing in both the lower courts and 
the Supreme Court. 
Although rejected by the courts below, Petitioners argued that the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s Uniform Guidelines 
for Employee Selection Procedures (“the Guidelines”) mandate that 
Respondents conduct a validation study before deciding not to certify 
the examinations.100 This argument is reasonable, given the fact that 
defendants merely relied on a “good faith belief” that disparate 
impact alone would justify their decision to decline certification.101 As 
 
 97. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 98. Id. at 244–45; Brief of Respondents, Ricci v. DeStefano, No. 08-328 (U.S. Nov. 13, 
2008). 
 99. See Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci I), 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 152 (D. Conn. 2006). 
 100. Id. at 154. 
 101. Id. at 151. 
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the Guidelines state, “the greater the severity of the adverse impact 
on a group, the greater the need to investigate the possible existence 
of unfairness.”102 The scenario in Ricci v. DeStefano presents the 
situation opposite to typical discrimination cases, but Respondents 
should still have a duty to look into the validity of the exams before 
rejecting them without further investigation. The examinations may in 
fact have been unfair, but the Guidelines imply that a validation study 
would be necessary in order to uphold such a defense.103 As 
Petitioners rightfully concede, Title VII provides that professionally-
developed and properly-validated tests are a defense to a claim of 
disparate impact.104 Thus, Respondents’ fear of potential Title VII 
liability with regard to minority applicants would be unwarranted if 
the promotion exam was proved valid. If the Supreme Court adopts 
Petitioners’ arguments on this issue, the Petitioners have a greater 
chance of prevailing on their discrimination claim. 
B. Strengths and Weaknesses of Respondents’ Argument 
The strength of Respondents’ case stems from the overarching 
policy rationale behind their actions—achieving racial diversity in the 
fire department. Respondents, however, put forth a weak attempt to 
justify the actions they took in purported compliance with Title VII. 
The Board argues that it rejected the test results based in large part 
on the testimony of Dr. Christopher Hornick, an 
industrial/organizational psychologist who runs a consulting business 
in competition with IOS who testified at the Civil Service Board 
hearings.105 Dr. Hornick testified that the results of the promotional 
tests had a “relatively high adverse impact” and that the test his 
company designs would not produce such an unfair result.106 Although 
testimony from other experts in the field provided contrary feedback, 
the Board decided that Dr. Hornick’s testimony provided it the basis 
for a good faith belief that certifying the results would put the Board 
in violation of Title VII and state anti-discrimination laws.107 A good 
faith belief, rather than an informed belief, in the legitimacy of their 
actions is a weak argument to present to the Supreme Court. 
 
 102. Id. at 155. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 154; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). 
 105. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 148. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
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Although the adequacy of Respondents’ justification for their 
actions is questionable, they do have statistics on their side. 
Specifically, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s 
(“EEOC’s”) “four-fifths rule” states that a selection tool that yields a 
selection rate for any racial group that is less than four-fifths of the 
rate for the group with the highest rate is generally regarded by 
federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact.108 Here, 
black applicants had a pass rate of about one-half that of the white 
applicants—well below the four-fifths required to satisfy EEOC 
standards.109 Because this low pass rate was not appreciably different 
from the rate in years past, when Respondents took no action, 
Petitioners may still be able to establish the required pretext on 
behalf of Respondents.110 Respondents’ assertion that their actions 
were merely a response to the disparate pass rate on the exam is 
suspect and should be examined further by the Supreme Court. 
C. Likely Disposition of the Supreme Court 
Given its prior holdings in equal protection cases, the Supreme 
Court will likely reverse the judgment of the Second Circuit and find 
in favor of Petitioners.111 The Court has held that “[r]ace-based 
government decision making is categorically prohibited unless 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.”112 Thus, unlike the 
Second Circuit, the Court will likely apply strict scrutiny to 
Respondents’ actions. Although it has held diversity to be a 
compelling interest in higher education due to the educational 
benefits of having a “critical mass” of diverse students, it is unlikely 
that the same diversity rationale will be accepted in the civil service 
arena.113 
As the Court held in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., one of 
the purposes of strict scrutiny is to “smoke out” attempts by city 
 
 108. Id. at 153. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 154. 
 111. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (subjecting race-based 
decision-making to strict scrutiny); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) 
(barring quota systems in college admissions due to unconstitutionality with regard to non-
minority applicants); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 
(2006) (failing to find compelling interest in outright racial balancing). 
 112. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2770. 
 113. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)(finding that law schools have a compelling 
interest in obtaining a diverse student body). 
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officials to practice racially-motivated politics under the guise of 
remedial action.114 If the Court finds that Respondents’ actions were 
the result of undue political influence, it would be hard-pressed to 
allow this justification to pass strict scrutiny. The Court has deemed 
“outright racial balancing” to be unconstitutional and may very well 
characterize New Haven’s actions as such.115 Unless the Court 
significantly deviates from its precedent, the Respondents’ arguments 
are unlikely to prevail under a more exacting standard of review. 
 
 
 114. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 488 (1989). 
 115. Id. at 507; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330; Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2757. 
